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Articles 
THE LEGALIZATION OF SAME-GENDER SEXUAL INTIMACY 
IN MARYLAND 
by Dwight H. Sullivan, Michael Adams, and Martin H. Schreiber II 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminalizing sexual intimacy is an unwarranted 
invasion of personal liberty. Government simply has 
no legitimate interest in prohibiting private, non-
commercial intimate sexual activity between consenting 
adults. The Annotated Code of Maryland appears to 
violate this principle by subjecting those engaged in 
certain common acts of sexual intimacy to up to ten 
years in prison. Article 27, section 554 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland makes it a crime for a person to 
"tak[ e] into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any 
other person," or to "plac[e] his or her sexual organ in 
the mouth of any other person."1 That section also 
prohibits "any other unnatural or perverted sexual 
practice with any other person."2 Further, Article 27, 
section 553 outlaws "sodomy,"3 or anal sex. 
If these statutes were to be applied literally, they 
would criminalize acts that the vast majority of 
I MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996). Violations of this codal section 
are punishable by a fine of up to $1,000, confinement for up to ten 
years, or both. [d. Oral sex was first made a crime under Maryland law 
in 1916. SeeSchochetv. State, 320Md. 714, 733 n.5, 580A.2d 176,185 
n.5 (1990). 
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996). This section makes it a crime to 
"take[ ] into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any other person or 
animal. .. or.... commit[] any other unnatural or perverted sexual 
practice with any other person or animal .... " [d. A violation of this 
statute is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or confinement for up 
to ten years. [d. 
3 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 553 (1996). Sodomy is punishable by 
confinement for up to ten years. [d.. This section traces its roots to a 
1793 statute. See 1793 Md. Laws ch. 57, § 10. At common law, the 
offense of "crimes against nature" was "narrowly limited to copUlation 
per anum." See Rosev. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 53 (1975). "Most American 
jurisdictions," however, "have expanded the definition of sodomy to 
include contact between mouth and genitals." See RICHARD A. POSNER 
& KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA's SEX LAWS 65 (1996). 
See generally Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crjme 
& the Constitutjon, 30 J. FAM. L. 45 (1991); Jeremy D. Weinstein, 
Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 195, 
201-25 (1986). 
Americans - and, presumably, Marylanders - practice.4 
The Court of Appeals of Mary land's 1990 ruling in 
Schochet v. State,S however, e~empted private, non-
commercial, consensual heterosexual oral sex from the 
reach of Maryland's criminal law. But that ruling left 
same-gender couples who practice oral or anal sex 
vulnerable to prosecution, while also creating 
uncertainty over the permissibility of prosecuting 
heterosexual couples who engage in anal sex. 
A 1999 ruling by the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City has largely corrected Schochet 's limitations. In the 
wake of Williams v. State,6 all Marylanders may now 
engage in private, non-commercial, consensual sexual 
intimacy without fear of prosecution. The Williarm decision 
is in line with a recent trend toward eliminating archaic sex 
laws, which has left only a minority of states with operable 
sodomy statutes. 7 
While advancing gay and lesbian rights, as well as 
signifying a victory for the privacy rights of all Marylanders, 
the Williams ruling stopped short of completely 
decriminalizing the field of sexual intimacy. Williams 
forecloses prosecution of private, non-commercial, 
4 See JUNE M. REINISCH, THE KINSEY INSTITUTE NEW REpORT ON SEX 132 
(1990) (noting that a "study reported that more than 90 percent of 
married couples younger than 25 had engaged in oral sex" while another 
"study of more than 100 heterosexual couples of all ages reported a 
similar percentage"); see also JAMES PATTERSON & PETER KIM, THE DAY 
AMERICA TOLD THE TRUTH 81 (1991)(finding that 79 percent of the men 
and 70 percent of the women surveyed had engaged in oral sex and 40 
percent of the men and 34 percent of the women surveyed had engaged 
in anal sex). 
~ 320 Md. 714,580 A.2d 176 (1990). 
6No. 980360311CC-I059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (BaIt. City Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 15, 1998). 
7 Only eighteen states and Puerto Rico now have operable sodomy 
statutes, five of which apply only to same-gender partners. American 
Civil Liberties Union, Status of u.s. Sodomy Laws (last modified Jan. 
1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy.html>. In one ofthose 
eighteen states, Louisiana, a Court of Appeal decision recently struck 
down the sodomy statute to the extent that it prohibited non-commercial, 
consensual, private sexual behavior. See State v. Smith, No. 97-KA-
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 15 
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consensual sex acts themselves, but leaves open the 
possibility of prosecuting someone merely for asking 
another adult to engage in such legal acts. This article will 
discuss the implications of Schochet and Williams and 
suggest approaches for completing the decriminalization 
of intimate sexual activity in Maryland. 
II. SCHOCHET V. STATE 
Steven Adam Schochet was tried in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County for allegedly forcing a 
woman to engage in several sex acts with him in her 
apartment. 8 Schochet admitted to having sex with the 
woman, including an act of fellatio, but maintained that 
she had consented.9 The jury apparently believed 
Schochet, acquitting him of all of the charged forcible 
sex acts.1O The judge, however, had declined the 
defense's request for an instruction that consent was a 
defense to the oral sex charge. I I In light of the judge's 
instructions and Schochet's own admission that the 
alleged victim had performed fellatio on him, it is hardly 
surprising that the jury found him guilty of violating 
the "unnatural and perverted sexual practices" statute. 12 
1393, 1999 WL 74614 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1999); see also Louisiana 
Electorate of Gays and Lesbians v. State of Louisiana, No. 94-9260 
(Orleans Civ. Dist. Parish Ct. March 17, 1999). Other recent decisions 
striking down sodomy statutes include Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 
(Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) 
(invalidating sodomy statute under state constitutional right to privacy); 
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S. W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996) (invalidating 
sodomy statute under state constitution); and Commonwealth v. Wasson, 
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). 
8 See Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 717-18, 580 A.2d 176, 177-78 
(1990). Schochet was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the 
second degree, first and second degree sexual offenses for engaging in 
forcible oral and anal intercourse, sodomy, and unnatural and perverted 
sexual practices. [d. 
9 See id. at 720-21, 580 A.2d at 179. Schochet, however, denied engaging 
in anal intercourse. [d. at 721, 580 A.2d at 179. 
\0 See id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. The jury also acquitted him of the 
sodomy charge. [d. 
II See id. at 722 & n.3, 580 A.2d at 180 & n.3. 
12 See id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. 
29.2 U. Balt L.F. 16 
Schochet appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, arguing that the United 
States Constitution prohibits the criminalization of 
"private and noncommercial sexual acts between 
consenting heterosexual adults."13 The court of special 
appeals affirmed Schochet's conviction by a two-to-one 
decision. Judge Moylan, joined by Judge Garrity, held 
that the United States Constitution provides no 
"protection for sexual activity - orthodox or 
unorthodox, heterosexual or homosexual - at least 
outside of marriage."14 Judge Wilner, in dissent, 
concluded that both the United States Constitution's 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights l5 protected Schochet from 
prosecution for engaging in private, consensual, non-
commercial, heterosexual fellatio. 16 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
Schochet's certiorari petition and, in a maj ority opinion 
written by Judge Eldridge, overturned Schochet's 
conviction without reaching the constitutional issue. 
Rather than siding with the court of special appeals 
majority or dissent, the court of appeals narrowly 
construed the unnatural and perverted sexual practices 
statute to exclude acts of consensual, private, non-
commercial, heterosexual oral sex from its scope. 
The court of appeals initially noted that "very 
strong arguments, based on Supreme Court decisions 
and language in Supreme Court opinions, can be made 
on both sides of the constitutional right to privacy issue 
presented here."17 These conflicting arguments resulted 
13 Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 315, 317, 541 A.2d 183, 183-84 
(1988). 
14 See id. at 339,541 A.2d at 195. 
IS Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, "That no 
man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, 
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, 
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment 
of his peers, or by the Law of the land." The Court of Appeals has 
indicated that Article 24 is coextensive with the u.S. Constitution's 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Lodowski v. State, 307 
Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986). 
16 See Schochet, 75 Md. App. at 362-63, 541 A.2d at 206-07 (Wilner, 
1., dissenting). 
17 See Schochet, 320 Md. at 726,580 A.2d at 181. 
in a "significant division" among courts "addressing the 
constitutionality of pmrishing consensual, heterosexual acts 
between consenting adults in private .... "18 The Maryland 
court cited seven cases supporting a constitutional right to 
engage in such conduct, 19 while citing an additional six 
cases for the opposite view.20 The majority concluded 
that ''the approximately even division among appellate 
courts reinforces our conclusion that the constitutional issue 
here presented is a very difficult one. "21 
Next, the court analyzed whether the language of 
Article 27, section 554 could be narrowly construed 
to avoid the constitutional question. Chief Judge 
Murphy's dissent argued that the oral sex statute does 
not permit a limiting construction because its 
"all-encompassing language was plainly intended to 
reach those 'unnatural' or 'perverted' sexual practices, 
therein so vividly described, without exception."22 The 
majority, however, rejected this argument, expressly 
relying on the "very broad and sweeping" language of 
section 554 to conclude that "[t]he statute's silence 
concerning the matters of consent, privacy, marriage, 
etc., creates legitimate questions regarding the reach 
of the statute."23 
The court of appeals also surveyed its own case 
law involving sections 553 and 554,24 noting that "many 
cases in this Court involving §§ 554 or 553 have been 
prosecutions for homosexual activity ,"25 "prosecutions 
for sexual acts with minors,"26 and prosecutions for 
sexual activity "in places which could not be considered 
'private. "'27 But "none has been a prosecution based 
on consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity 
18 Id. 
19 See id. at 726-27, 580 A.2d at 181-82. 
20 See id. at 727,580 A.2d at 182. 
21 Id. at 728,580 A.2d at 183. 
22!d. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 729,580 A.2d at 183. 
24 Id. at 731-34, 580 A.2d at 184-85. 
2' Schochet, 320 Md. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
26Id. at 731,580 A.2d at 185. 
27 Id. 
Articles 
between adults in the privacy of the home. "28 
Ultimately, the court held that under the circumstances 
of the case, section 554 did not apply; therefore, the 
conviction had to be reversed.29 Schochet's net effect 
was to legalize heterosexual oral sex and throw into doubt 
the continued crimina1ization ofheterosexual anal sex, while 
leaving acts of same-gender oral and anal sex open to 
prosecution. 
III. WILLIAMS V. STATE 
A. Attacking the Prohibition Against Same-Gender 
Oral Sex 
In the wake of Schochet, some Maryland law 
enforcement agencies continued vigorous application of 
section 554 to gay men, including arrests for invitations to 
go to private places to engage in consensual, 
non-commercial oral sex.30 Following one such 
undercover sting operation designed to arrest men for 
soliciting other men to engage in oral sex, the American 
Ci viI Liberties Union filed a challenge to section 554' s 
application to private, non-commercial, consensual, same-
gender oral sex.31 The suit challenged the use of Section 
15(e) of Article 27,32 which prohibits solicitation "for the 
28 !d. at 734, 580 A.2d at 185. 
29 See id. at 735,580 A.2d at 186. 
3() See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to State Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Williams v. State, No. 980360311CC-l 059, 
1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Bait. City Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of 
probable cause indicating that a defendant was arrested under section 
15(e) for inviting an undercover police officer "to come to his house" to 
engage in oral sex). See generally PJ. Shuey, Dozens Busted/or Lewdness 
at Adult Store, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 12, 1997, at BI. The 
stigmatizing effect of an Anne Arundel County sting operation was 
heightened by the Capital's publication of the names and addresses of 
those arrested, including both an elementary school principal and a 
prominent U.S. Navy officer. See Navy Chief's Aide Charged in Sex 
Sting, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 13, 1997, at D 1. 
31 See Williams, at *2. 
32 See id. 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 17 
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purpose of ... lewdness,"33 to criminalize a request to 
engage in such a private, non-commercial, consensual sex 
act. 
The plaintiffs in Williams included four gay men and 
a lesbian who wished to engage in private intimate activity 
and who feared prosecution under Maryland law.34 One 
of these such plaintiffs had already been previously arrested 
for inviting an undercover police officer to engage in a 
private sex act.35 The final plaintiff was a taxpayer who 
objected to the use of her tax dollars to enforce statutes 
crimina1izing same-gender sexual intimacy.36 
The plaintiffs based their challenge on both privacy 
and equal protection principles. The privacy arguments 
advanced called for a reinterpretation offederal privacy 
law and a more expansive reading of Maryland privacy 
law.37 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,38 the 
Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution 
does not preclude states from criminalizing 
same-gender sex acts.39 Through its decision in Romer 
v. Evans,4o however, the Supreme Court had cast some 
doubt over Bowers' continued vitality.41 Thus, the 
Williams privacy challenge could have allowed the 
Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit Bowers. The 
Williams case also presented the Maryland Court of 
33 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 15(e) (1996). Section 15 provides, "[i]t 
shall be unlawful: ... (e) To procure or to solicit or offer to procure or 
solicit for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness or assignation." A 
violation of this statute is punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or 
confinement for up to one year. See id. at § 17. 
34 See Williams, at *2, 3. 
3S See id. 
36 See id. at *3. 
37 See id. at * 15. 
38 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
39 See id. at 190-91. 
40 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
41 See Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. 
L. REv. 373 (1997). See also Nabozny v. Podlesney, 92 F.3d 446, 458 
n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Of course Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the 
area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. 
Evans, [517 U.S. 620 (1996)]."). 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 18 
Appeals with an opportunity to find that the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights includes a broad privacy right 
that protects same-gender sexual activity. 
On the other hand, the equal protection claims 
raised unresolved questions of whether the federal or 
state constitutions prohibit the criminalization of 
same-gender intimate activity that is legal for married 
or unmarried heterosexual couples. The equal 
protection challenge under the United States 
Constitution was bolstered by the Supreme Court's 
holding in Romer v. Evans, which adopted a "muscular 
rational basis"42 standard to review laws that draw 
distinctions on the basis of sexual orientationY The 
complaint also raised a challenge under Article 46 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights (the state Equal 
Rights Amendment), which provides that "[e]quality 
of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied 
because of sex."44 At its most basic level, the 
criminalization of only same-gender oral sex acts 
appears to violate the equal rights guarantee. For 
example, imagine two people, A and B, engaged in an 
act of oral sex. Assume A is a man. Under Schochet' s 
interpretation of section 554, the sex act is legal ifB is 
a woman, but illegal ifB is a man. B's gender alone 
determines the act's legality, thus raising serious equal 
protection concerns under Article 46.45 
The defendants in Williams, who included both 
State of Maryland and Anne Arundel County officials, 
moved to dismiss the complaint. The crux of the 
defendants' argument was that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing to challenge section 554's applicability 
to private, non-commercial consensual same-gender 
oral sex because the statute was never enforced against 
42 Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle 
Transformation in Judicial Arguments over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L. 
REv. 893, 966. 
43 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
44 Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 46. 
4S See Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (holding that 
the cause of action for criminal conversation, which was available to a 
husband whose wife committed adultery, but not to a wife whose 
husband committed adultery, violated Article 46). 
such activity. 46 However, the defendants also offered a 
fall-back argument that would prove crucial to the 
case's resolution. The Attorney General's office argued 
on behalf of the State defendants that if the court 
determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge 
sections 1547 and 554, "it should construe those statutes 
so as not to apply to private, consensual, 
non-commercial homosexual activity."48 In Schochet, 
the court of appeals had already narrowed section 554 
to exclude "consensual, non-commercial, heterosexual 
activity between adults in the privacy of the home. "49 
In essence, the defendants asked the circuit court to 
narrow Schochet's construction of section 554 still 
further "by striking the word heterosexual from the 
holding."50 
In light of the defendants' proposed limiting 
construction, the outcome of the case would depend 
almost entirely on the standing issue. After receiving 
briefs and hearing oral arguments, Judge Richard T. 
Rombro of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held 
that the plaintiffs did, indeed, have standing to challenge 
the statutes.51 While noting that a criminal statute's 
mere existence is insufficient to provide standing,52 the 
court found that "Plaintiffs' concern goes beyond the 
mere existence of a criminal statute."53 Judge Rombro 
pointed to the possibility that a conviction for violating 
46 See Williams, at *8. 
47 See supra note 33. 
48 Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 
5, Williams v. State, No. 980360311CC-1059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 
(Bait. City Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998). The defendants maintained that if 
the court construed the statute in this manner, it should dismiss the 
suit. See id. at 6. While embracing the proposed statutory construction, 
the plaintiffs countered that the court should adopt the defendants' 
proffered construction by issuing an injunction and a declaratory 
judgment. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to State 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 24. 
49 Schochet , 320 Md. 714, 731, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (1990). 
50 Williams, at *21-22. 
51 See id. at *15. 
52 See id. at *13 (quoting Hitchock v. Kloman, 196 Md. 351, 356, 76 
A.2d 582, 584 (1950». -
53Id 
Articles 
the challenged statutes could jeopardize the licenses of 
those plaintiffs who are lawyers, thus threatening their ability 
to earn a living. 54 The court also noted that a conviction 
could threaten the plaintiffs' ability to serve as personal 
representatives of their partners' estates. 55 The court 
observed that twenty-four separate State's Attorneys had 
discretion to decide how to enforce the challenged 
statutes,56 thus making it impossible to know how each of 
those officeholders and their successors would choose to 
enforce those sections. 57 Accordingly, the court found 
that it could not say that the plaintiffs' subjective fear of 
prosecution was merely imagined, and that the challenge 
presented "a justiciable issue, ripe for resolution."58 
After resolving the question of standing, the court 
considered the proper scope of section 5 54. In a ringing 
endorsement of the principle that individuals should 
be treated equally regardless of their sexual orientation, 
Judge Rombro opined, "[i]t cannot be doubted, as 
Defendants concede, that there would be an equal 
protection violation if acts, considered not criminal 
when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be 
prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple. 
There is simply no basis for the distinction."59 Judge 
Rombro then offered an analogy to support his 
conclusion: "[0 ]ne group may drive at 60 miles per 
hour, but another would be prosecuted for driving at a 
speed greater than 50 miles per hour. Merely to state 
such a hypothesis is to show its constitutional 
infirmity."60 Thus, "in order to avoid serious 
constitutional issues,"61 the court held that section 554 
"does not encompass consensual, non-commercial, 
54 See id. at * 14. 
55 See id. See also LaGrange v. Hinton, 91 Md. App. 294, 603 A.2d 
1385 (1992) (holding that a person convicted of violating section 554 
is ineligible to serve as an executor or administrator of a will). 
56 See id. at * 14. 
57 See id. at * 14-15. 
58Id 
59Id at *22. 
6°Id 
61Id. (quoting Schochet). 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 19 
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heterosexual or homosexual activity between adults in 
private."62 
B. Extending the Court's Ruling to the Prohibition 
Against Anal Sex 
Less than nine months after Williams was filed, 
the court ruled that Maryland's criminal law should 
not make distinctions based on sexual orientation. 
While that ruling was an enormous step forward, it 
applied only to section 554, which governs oral sex, 
and not to section 553, which governs anal sex. In the 
wake of Schochet and the initial Williams opinion, 
section 553' s continued applicability to both 
heterosexual and same-gender private, non-
commercial, consensual anal sex was unclear. 
To resolve this continued uncertainty as to section 
553' s scope, the plaintiffs negotiated an agreement 
under which the defendants consented to the circuit 
court's extension of its Williams ruling to section 553 
as well. That extension fit well within the legal 
framework established by Schochet and the initial 
Williams opinion. While the Schochet court did not 
directly construe section 553, because Schochet had 
been acquitted of the sodomy charge,63 the Schochet 
decision's rationale seems to apply to section 553 as 
well as to section 554. In finding that section 554's 
application to private, consensual, non-commercial 
heterosexual sexual activity would raise constitutional 
doubt, the court of appeals pointed to seven cases 
invalidating or limiting other states' statutes 
criminalizing private sexual activity.64 Six of those 
seven statutes prohibited not only oral sex, but also 
sodomy as defined by section 553. Additionally, since 
62Id. 
63 See supra notes 10-11. 
64 Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 726-27, 580 A.2d 176, 181-82 (1990) 
(citing State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); People v. Onofre, 
415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okl. Crim. 
App. 1986), Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Penn. 1980); 
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968) (concluding that 
application of Indiana's sodomy statute to marital sexual acts raises 
substantial constitutional questions), Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. 
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 
1977». 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 20 
the court of appeals decided Schochet in 1990, several 
other states' sodomy laws had also been judicially 
invalidated. 65 Thus, the constitutional doubt regarding 
application of section 554 to private, non-commercial, 
consensual sexual activity also envelops the application 
of section 553 to anal sex. 
At the request of the parties in Williams, the circuit 
court agreed to extend its initial ruling to include section 
553 as well as section 554.66 Accordingly, the court 
resolved the Williams case by declaring "that Article 
27, Sections 553 and 554 of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland do not apply to consensual, non-commercial, 
private sexual activities .... "67 The court also enjoined 
the defendants - including the State of Maryland and 
its employees - from enforcing those sections in cases 
of consensual, non-commercial, private sexual 
activity. 68 This injunction gives the Williams ruling 
statewide effect due to the fact that every prosecutor 
in Maryland is a state employee.69 
The importance of the Williams ruling lies in two 
aspects that reach beyond the court of appeals' 
Schochet holding. First, while Schochet construed 
section 554 to exclude acts of private, non-commercial, 
consensual heterosexual oral sex,7° the Williams ruling 
expands the exception to apply to same-gender oral 
sex acts as well.71 Second, the Schochet holding, though 
not necessarily its rationale, was limited to section 
554.72 The Williams ruling, however, applies to section 
6S See supra note 7. 
66 See Williams, at *1. 
67Id. 
61 See id. 
69 See Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591,600, 185 A.2d 368,374 (1962) 
(holding that a State's Attorney is a state, rather than local, official). 
The Attorney General, another state official, is responsible for handling 
criminal appeals for the prosecution. See Md. Const. art. V, § 3(a)(I). 
70See Schochet, 320 Md. at 734,580 A.2d at 186. 
71 See Williams, at *25 
72 See Schochet, 320 Md. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186. 
553 as well as section 554.73 Williams thus largely 
decriminalizes private consensual sexual activity in 
Maryland. 
IV. THE CONTINUED CRIMINALIZATION OF 
SOLICITATION 
Even after Williams, Maryland's criminal law still 
improperly intrudes into one area of personal 
relationships: requests to engage in intimate activity. 
The Williams plaintiffs had challenged application of 
Maryland's solicitation statute - Article 27, section 
15(er4 - to requests to engage in private, non-
commercial, consensual sex acts. This challenge was 
based on the proposition that "once private intimate 
activity is recognized as legal, a request to engage in 
that activity cannot be criminal."75 In rejecting this 
argument, Judge Rombro reasoned that the court of 
appeals' "Schochet decision held that acts between 
consenting adults which were conducted in private are 
not criminal. An unwanted solicitation is neither private 
nor consensual."76 The circuit court found that "the 
varied ramifications of solicitation make it inappropriate 
for a court to declare such a statute facially 
unconstitutional."77 The court contended that legal 
distinctions arise according to "whether the solicitation 
occurs in a bar, gay or straight, [ or] in a shopping mall. 
In the latter case, there is involved an element of 
harassment and nuisance: cases arising from that set of 
facts usually come about because of merchant 
complaints that their customers have received 
unwelcome overtures."78 That assertion, nevertheless, 
is open to doubt; in many arrests for solicitation in 
73 See Williams, at *1. 
74 See supra note 33. 
75 Williams, at *22-23 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition 
to State, at 22). 




public places, the "victims" are undercover police officers 
purposely creating an impression that they desire to be 
solicited.79 
Regardless of the accuracy of the court's empirical 
assessment, not every annoyance is-or should be-
subject to criminal prosecution. A man who approaches 
a woman at a bar, on a street comer, or in a park and 
suggests that they go to his home to engage in sexual 
intercourse may be guilty of boorish behavior, but he 
is not guilty of a crime. If a man approaches another 
man and suggests that they go to his home to engage 
in oral or anal sex, he is guilty of a crime. The law then 
violates the equal protection rationale that was crucial 
to the Williams ruling interpretation of section 554. 
The circuit court was wrong, then, in maintaining that 
section 15 ( e) "prohibits solicitation by either 
homosexuals or heterosexuals. "80 Contrary to the 
court's insistence that "one segment of society is not 
singled out,"81 gay men appear to be the only targets 
of prosecution under section 15( e) for asking someone 
to engage in non-commercial intimacy. Moreover, 
Judge Rombro's rationale does not address why the 
state should be permitted to criminalize any discussion 
of private sexual activity between adults, regardless of 
whether the prohibition targets a specific group or 
applies across-the-board. Unconstitutional restrictions 
on free speech are not cured simply by applying them 
indiscriminately. 
7') See generally, Philip P. Pan, Pro George s Judge Is Arrested in Restroom, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1998, at CI; Justice Stanley Mosk, Project-The 
Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of 
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. 
REv. 643, 690-94 (1966) (discussing police sting techniques); Larry CatA 
Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization 
of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of 
Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REv. 755, 778-79 (1992) (noting that 
"enforcing laws suppressing certain forms of private consensual activity 
... may create more crime than it prevents"). 
SU Williams, at *24. 
SlId 
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The factor that should govern the legality of a request 
to engage in non-commercial sexual intimacy is not the 
location of the request, but rather the proposed location 
of the act. If an individual solicits an adult to go to a private 
place to engage in a non-commercial sex act, then the 
requested act should be legal. Conversely, if an individual 
solicits an adult to engage in a sex act in a public place, 
such as a shopping mall restroom, then the requested act 
may constitute indecent exposure and, if so, may therefore 
be subject to punishment.82 
Criminalizing requests -- even requests in public 
places -- to engage in private sexual activity would present 
a serious constitutional question. The First Amendment&3 
simply does not allow the criminalization of pure speech 
for the purpose of proposing a legal activity,84 at least absent 
a harassment element, which section 15(e) lacks. That 
principle is consistent with the New York Court of 
Appeals' decision in People v. Uplinger, which 
considered a statute that criminalized loitering "in a public 
place for the purpose of engaging, or soliciting another 
person to engage, in deviate sexual intercourse or other 
sexual behavior of a deviate nature. "85 The New York 
court invalidated the statute, reasoning that "[i]nasmuch 
as the conduct ultimately contemplated by the loitering 
statute may not be deemed criminal, we perceive no basis 
upon which the State may continue to punish loitering for 
that purpose. "86 
Therefore, applying section 15( e) to requests to 
engage in private, non-commercial, consensual sex acts 
presents a serious constitutional issue that can be avoided 
simply by construing section 15( e) to exclude requests to 
engage in such conduct. Indeed, the statutory construction 
H2 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27. § 335A (1996). This section makes 
"indecent exposure" a crime punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or 
confinement for up to three years. Id. 
H3 See U.S. CON ST. amend. I. 
K41d. 
HI 447 N.E.2d 62, 62 (N.Y. 1983) (quoting PENAL LAW § 240.35. subd. 
3). 
HI. Id. at 63. 
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rule of in pari materia87 offers the best interpretation of 
section 15( e). In applying this concept, section 15( e) 
prohibits solicitation to commit "lewdness." Section 16, 
in tum, defines "lewdness" as "any unnatural sexual 
practice."88 Section 554's title is "Unnatural or perverted 
sexual practices." Accordingly, even absent any 
constitutional difficulties arising from the criminalization of 
pure speech, the most logical interpretation of section 15( e) 
is that it prohibits only requests to engage in activities that 
are illegal under section 554.89 Under Williams, section 
554 "do[es] not apply to consensual, non-commercial, 
private sexual activities."90 Hence, a request to engage in 
such activity is not a solicitation of "lewdness" as that 
term is defined under Maryland law. 
v. STATUTORY REVISION 
While the Williams ruling brings Maryland in line 
with the majority of states by legalizing private 
consensual intimate activity, the ruling is in danger of 
being overlooked. Because the case was resolved at 
the circuit court level without an appeal, the decision will 
not appear in Michie's Annotated Code of Maryland. The 
opinion is available via LEXIS, but only in the GENFED 
library's EXTRA file. In time, police agencies, state's 
attorneys, and evenjudges may become unfamiliar with 
the Williams ruling, thus risking law enforcement activity 
enjoined by Williams. 
H7 See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcnON § 51 
(5th ed. 1992). The rule of in pari materia provides that where two 
statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be construed 
together. This rule of statutory construction is well established under 
Maryland law. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 
675,679 (1994). 
HH MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 16 (1996). This section describes the terms 
"prostitution," "lewdness," and "assignation" as follows: (I) prostitution 
- "the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire," 
(2) lewdness - "any unnatural sexual practice," (3) assignation - "the 
making of any appointment, or engagement for prostitution or lewdness 
or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement." 
H9 This proposed construction does not conflict with In re Appeal No. 
180,278 Md. 443, 365 A.2d 540 (1976), which broadly construes section 
IS's use of the word "solicit." Rather than interpreting the word 
"solicit," this proposed construction limits those acts that constitute 
"lewdness." 
')11 Williams, at *1. 
To ensure that Maryland law is applied consistently 
with the State's own recommended interpretation in 
Williams, the Article 27 Revision Comrnittee91 should 
propose either modifying sections 15(e), 553, and 554to 
exclude private, non-commercial, consensual sex acts or, 
in the alternative, abolishing sections 553 and 554 
altogether while deleting the word "lewdness" from section 
15( e). Maryland law has other provisions that criminalize 
non-consensual sex acts,92 public sex acts, 93 and 
commercial sex acts.94 These provisions are sufficient to 
regulate undesirable forms of vaginal intercourse; no reason 
exists to suspect that they are insufficient to regulate oral 
and anal sex as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The decriminalization of consensual sex in 
Maryland began with the court of appeals decision in 
Schochet. Williams has advanced the evolutionary 
process begun by Schochet, but that evolution is not 
yet complete. Maryland law now presents the anomaly 
of certain forms of behavior enjoying greater protection 
than the mere pure speech about those behaviors. This 
anomaly could be cured by a judicial interpretation of 
section 15( e) that narrows it to match the Schochet/ 
Williams framework. Alternatively, section 15( e) could 
be narrowed legislatively in conjunction with a 
codification of Schochet and Williams. Only then will 
the bedrooms of the "Free State" truly be free. 
91 See generally MARYLAND MANUAL 1996-1997 at 135-37 (Diane P. 
Frese ed.) (1996) (discussing Code Revision Committee and Article 
27 Revision Committee). 
92 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 462-64C (1996). 
93 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 335A (1996). 
94 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 15 (1996). 
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